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Abstract
We use the concept of cartel stability deﬁned by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) to
obtain that the sequence of play between the cartel and the fringe aﬀects cartel
stability in a quantity-competition setting where ﬁrms tacitly collude. We also
prove that an endogenous sequence of play between a cartel and a fringe depends
on the discount factor. If the discount factor is large enough, the cartel and the
fringe simultaneously choose quantities since the stable cartel may contain more
ﬁrms under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership. This is due to the fact
that under simultaneous play cartel ﬁrms have incentives to participate in the cartel
because otherwise no collusion is possible.
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11 Introduction
The concept of a stable cartel deﬁned in d’Aspremont et al. (1983) is one of the ﬁrst
contributions in the analysis of cartel formation in oligopoly markets. A cartel is stable
if no ﬁrm inside the cartel ﬁn d si td e s i r a b l et oe x i ta n dn oﬁrm outside the cartel ﬁnds
it desirable to enter. More recent work follows this path and explores conditions under
which the stable cartels exist. For instance, Donsimoni et al. (1986) and Shaﬀer (1995)
characterize the set of stable cartels in a model of price and quantity competition re-
spectively. In these papers it has been shown that cartels containing approximately just
over half the ﬁrms in the industry are stable. In such models, and to the best of our
knowledge in all the cartel and fringe literature (for instance Selten (1973), Donsimoni
(1985), Thoron (1998) or Lofaro (1999)), it is assumed without further analysis that the
cartel behaves as a leader with respect to the fringe. By their very nature, these models
may be viewed as models of binding collusion since they also assume the existence of an
enforcement mechanism for collusive behavior within the cartel such that once a ﬁrm de-
cides to join the cartel, the possibility of cheating on the agreement is ruled out. Another
strand in the literature on collusion, the supergame-theoretic approach also termed tacit
or implicit collusion, has focused on the problem of enforcement of collusive behavior.
This approach analyzes the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium –henceforth,
SPNE– that maximizes industry proﬁts (see for example the seminal paper by Friedman
(1971), Davidson and Deneckere (1984), Martin (1993) or Rothschild (1999)). However,
this approach focuses on ﬁrms’ “incentive constraints” and leaves out ﬁrms’ “participation
constraints”,1 and therefore the suitability of the leadership assumption is not considered
either. In this paper, we address the question of whether cartels have an incentive to
behave as a Stackelberg leader by analyzing the cartel-stability problem in an inﬁnitely
repeated setting using SPNE as solution concept. We develop a multi-period oligopoly
model with homogeneous, quantity-setting ﬁrms, a subset of which are assumed to collude
1“Participation constraints” determine the incentives that ﬁrms have to join a cartel. However, “in-
centive constraints” determine the incentives of cartel ﬁrms to deviate from the collusive agreement.
2while the remaining (fringe) ﬁrms choose their output levels noncooperatively.2 Then, us-
ing the concept proposed by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) for cartel stability, we endogeneize
cartel formation by analyzing the number of ﬁrms that are willing to participate in a cartel
when ﬁrms have the possibility to tacitly collude. Subsequently, we examine and discuss
the equilibrium sequence of moves between the cartel and the fringe.
We show that when the cartel does not behave as a leader, cartel ﬁrms may be willing
to participate in the smallest cartel among those which can be sustained as a SPNE
since although ﬁrms might have incentives to exit the cartel, the threat of no collusion at
equilibrium induces them to collude. On the other hand, when the cartel is allowed to lead,
the previous mentioned results on cartel stability with binding collusion extend to the case
of tacit collusion. This leads us to obtain that when the discount factor is large enough, the
stable cartel may contain more ﬁrms under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership.
Consequently, although for a given cartel size cartel ﬁrms obtain larger proﬁts with the
leadership, when the cartel is allowed to impose its most preferred production timing,
the sequence of play between a cartel and a fringe depends on the discount factor. If the
discount factor is large enough, the cartel and the fringe simultaneously choose quantities.
The intuition is that ﬁrms may prefer to stay outside the leader cartel and free-ride on
the high price induced by collusion. Conversely, under simultaneous play the incentives
to free-ride are reduced since by not participating in the cartel, ﬁrms risk the complete
collapse of collusion. The main economic implication is that the antitrust authorities may
be extremely wary to take the quantity leadership as a symptom of collusive behavior.
Conversely, when tacit collusion is easily sustained, cartel ﬁrms may have strong incentives
not to behave as a Stackelberg leader.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the model and
we study cartel stability. In a subsection, we study the production timing between the
cartel and the fringe. We conclude in section 3. All proofs are grouped together in the
appendix.
2The assumption of a cartel involving a subset of ﬁrms is based on the fact that some of the best
known examples of cartels involve only a part of the industry. Some signiﬁcant cases are the citric acid,
the carbonless paper or the North Atlantic shipping industries (see Levenstein and Suslow (2006)).
32 The model and results
We consider an industry with N>2 ﬁrms, indexed by i =1 ,...,N.E a c hﬁrm produces a
quantity of a homogeneous product with a linear cost function c(qi)=cqi,w h e r eqi is the
output produced by ﬁrm i. The industry inverse demand is given by the piecewise linear
function p(Q)=m a x ( 0 ,a−bQ) where Q =
PN
i=1 qi is the industry output, p is the output
price and a>0 with a>c . We assume that K ∈ [2,N] ﬁrms, indexed by k =1 ,...,K –
henceforth, cartel ﬁrms– behave cooperatively so as to maximize their joint proﬁts. The
remaining (N−K) ﬁrms constitute the fringe and choose their output in a non-cooperative
way. We assume that only one cartel is formed and that ﬁrms compete repeatedly over
an inﬁnite horizon with complete information (i.e. each of the ﬁrms either fringe or cartel
observes the whole history of actions) and discount the future using a discount factor
δ ∈ (0,1). Time is discrete and dates are denoted by t =1 ,2,.... In this framework, a







Pt−1 is the set of all possible histories of actions (output choices) of all cartel
ﬁrms up to t − 1, with typical element στ
j, j =1 ,...,K, τ =1 ,...,t − 1,a n dQ is the set
of output choices available to each cartel ﬁrm. Following Friedman (1971), we restrict
our attention to the case where each cartel ﬁrm is only allowed to follow grim trigger
strategies. In words, these strategies are such that cartel ﬁrms adhere to the collusive
agreement until there is a defection, in which case they revert forever to the static N-ﬁrm
Nash equilibrium. Since ﬁrms are symmetric, each cartel ﬁr mp r o d u c e st h es a m ea m o u n t
of output that we denote by q. The output corresponding to noncooperative behavior is
denoted by qn. Since we restrict attention to trigger strategies, {St
k}
∞
t=1 can be speciﬁed
as follows. At t =1 , S1










j = q for all j =1 ,...,K and τ =1 ,...,t− 1
qn otherwise
(1)
Regarding fringe ﬁrms, their optimal response consists of maximizing their current pe-
riod’s payoﬀ. We denote the output produced by each fringe ﬁrm by qf.W e d e n o t e
by Πc(N,K) and Πf(N,K) the proﬁt function of a cartel ﬁrm and that of a fringe ﬁrm
respectively. As shown by Friedman (1971), cartel ﬁrms colluding in each period can be
4sustained as a SPNE of the repeated game with the strategy proﬁle (1) if and only if for








where Πd(N,K) denotes the proﬁts attained by an optimal deviation from the collusive
output, and Π(N) denotes the Nash equilibrium proﬁts. If δ exceeds a certain critical
level, (2) is not a binding constraint. For given values of N and K,w ed e n o t eb yδK the
minimum δ required for the condition (2) to be satisﬁed.
Deﬁnition 1 δK is said to be the minimum discount factor required for the cartel of K
ﬁrms to be sustainable as a SPNE. Then, a cartel of K ﬁr m si ss a i dt ob es u s t a i n a b l ei f
δ ≥ δK and δK ∈ (0,1).
2.1 Cartel stability
In this subsection we endogeneize cartel formation. We assume that ﬁrms can coordinate
in the diﬀerent outcomes by showing their willingness to participate in a collusive agree-
ment. This pre-communication play is modelled as a stage prior to market competition.
Those decisions will not aﬀect the payoﬀ of ﬁrms, but they will only be used as a coor-
dination device: if K ﬁrms decide to participate in a cartel agreement, a cartel of size
K can only be observed in the repeated game if the discount factor allows a cartel of K
ﬁr m st ob ea c t i v e(δ ≥ δK). Hence, the discounted payoﬀs attained by cartel and fringe



















1−δΠf(N,K) if δ ≥ δK
1
1−δΠ(N) otherwise.
In other words, we add to the game an initial stage in which ﬁrms simultaneously choose
whether or not to join the (unique) cartel and subsequently all ﬁrms produce for an
5inﬁnite number of periods.3 This repeated game setting exhibits multiple SPNE collusive
agreements. Therefore, to select among those equilibria, we adopt the particular criterion
of restricting attention to the strict Nash equilibria. At this initial stage, a strict Nash












0(N,K +1 ) . (5)
We note that these conditions are equivalent to the standard stability concept where no
individual move is desirable and where ﬁrms hypothesize that no other ﬁrm will change
its strategy concerning its membership in the cartel.4 Apart from the degenerate case
of K =1 , a cartel can be deﬁned as internally stable if it is not proﬁtable for a cartel
member to defect to the fringe (condition (4)). Likewise, apart from the degenerate case
of K = N,.a cartel is said to be externally stable if it is not proﬁtable for a fringe ﬁrm to
join the cartel (condition (5)).
Deﬁnition 2 Ac a r t e li ss a i dt ob es t a b l ei fi ti sb o t hi n t e r n a l l ya n de x t e r n a l l ys t a b l e .
We analyze two diﬀerent variations of the model described above: after the initial
participation stage in which ﬁrms choose whether or not to collude, cartel and fringe
ﬁrms produce for an inﬁnite number of periods (i) simultaneously choosing quantities (ii)
with cartel ﬁrms being a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe in each period.
We are now in the position to obtain the strict Nash equilibrium (namely, the number of
ﬁrms in the stable cartel) in each of the two diﬀerent production timings. We focus on
the equilibria where a number 0 <K≤ N of ﬁrms join the cartel.5
3It should be noted that like previous studies, we do not solve which K of N ex ante identical ﬁrms
will precommit to collude.
4Thoron (1998) proves the correspondence between this stability concept and the Nash equilibria
5We focus on the strict Nash equilibria since the analysis of the Nash equilibria would lead us to
uninteresting results. For instance, when for each K , δ<δ K,t h e nﬁrms obtain the same proﬁts by
joining the cartel than by staying at the fringe. Therefore, joining the cartel is always a Nash equilibrium.
We note also that the equilibria in which all ﬁrms decide not to join the cartel are not considered.
6Proposition 1 When cartel and fringe ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities the small-
est cartel among those that are sustainable is stable.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. As shown in the appendix, Πc(N,K) <
Πf(N,K − 1) and thus, internal stability is not satisﬁed in the one-shot game. We note
that this is related to a well-known result in the literature that, in a Cournot setting, al-
though mergers (or any other collusive agreement) increase price, they are (generally) not
proﬁtable because non-participating ﬁrms react by increasing their production.6 Then, it
can be checked from (3) and(4) that if δK ≤ δ<1 ﬁrms inside the cartel of K ﬁrms ﬁnd
it desirable to exit. On the other hand, if δK < 1,i ti ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n gi nK.7 Then,
if δK ≤ δ<δ K−1 ac a r t e lo fK or more ﬁrms is sustainable but a cartel of more than
K ﬁrms is not stable because internal stability does not hold. However, in this case a
cartel of K ﬁrms is stable because by leaving the cartel a ﬁr mw o u l do b t a i nl o w e rp r o ﬁts
(namely, the Nash equilibrium proﬁts) since the cartel of K − 1 ﬁrms is not sustainable.
In other words, only the smallest sustainable cartel is stable because although ﬁrms have
incentives to exit the cartel, they collude when the sustainability of collusion depends on
their participation.
Proposition 2 When cartel ﬁrms behave as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe
and N ≥ 4,ac a r t e lo fK ﬁrms is stable whenever δ ≥ δK and K ∈ [f(N),f(N)+1 ]
where f(N)=1
4(1 + 3N −
2 p
(N − 2)N − 7).W h e n N<4,t h eu n i q u es t a b l ec a r t e li s
joint monopoly whenever δ ≥ δN. Otherwise no cartel is stable.
Proposition 2 indicates that a stable leader cartel contains just over half the ﬁrms in
the industry. This naturally extends previous results on cartel stability (see for instance
Shaﬀer (1995)) to the case of implicit collusion. In other words, when a cartel of K ﬁrms
i ss u s t a i n a b l ea saS P N Eo ft h er e p e a t e dg a m ei ss t a b l ew h e n e v e ri ti sa l s os t a b l ei nt h e
one-shot game. From Propositions 1 and 2 it is immediate to obtain the following.
6This paradoxical result that has been referred to as the “merger paradox” (see Salant et al. (1983))
is valid only in Cournot environments, and generally fails to hold in diﬀerentiated Bertrand models. This
is an issue not raised here and left for future research.
7Remark also the similarity with the result in Salant et al. (1983) that if a merger of K ﬁrms is
proﬁtable, a merger with more ﬁr m si sa l s op r o ﬁtable.
7Corollary 1 When N ≥ 4, there exists ¯ δ ∈ (0,1) such that if δ ≥ ¯ δ the stable cartel
contains more ﬁrms when all ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities, than when cartel
ﬁrms behave as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe.
2.2 Decision-making of production timing by the cartel
In this subsection we examine and discuss the equilibrium sequence of moves between the
cartel and the fringe. One can check that for a given N and K,( i )ac a r t e lﬁrm earns









K. From this analysis one may conclude that, in our model, an endogenous timing
would suggest a Stackelberg-type sequential moves model. However, this is not the end of
the story. Since for each δ,t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms constituting the cartel with simultaneous
play and leadership is the one derived in Propositions 1 and 2 respectively, we must also
consider that ﬁrms foresee that the size of the stable cartel depends on the production
timing. For simplicity and as in all cartel and fringe literature cited in the introduction, we
assume that the cartel is able to impose its most preferred timing.8 Thus, with complete
information in t =0all ﬁrms are perfectly informed about the fact that the cartel will
impose its preferable production timing. Then, as a function of δ ﬁrms may predict
the size of the cartel and consequently the sequence of play at equilibrium. Thus, the
game runs as follows. In t =0ﬁrms decide simultaneously whether or not to join the
cartel. Afterwards, and prior to market competition, the cartel chooses either Stackelberg
behavior or simultaneous play with the fringe depending on the number of ﬁrms that would
constitute the cartel in each case. In t =1market competition begins. By backwards
induction we have:
Proposition 3 When N ≥ 4,t h e r ee x i s t s˜ δ ∈ (0,1) such that if δ ≥ ˜ δ t h es e q u e n c eo fp l a y
8This assumption is based on the fact that partial cartels often involve a big market share. As an
example, the citric acid industry where three North-American and ﬁve European ﬁrm were ﬁned for
ﬁxing prices and allocating sales in the worldwide market. Their joint market share was around 60
percent. The fringe included a variety of minor companies based in Eastern Europe, Russia and China
that could unlikely coordinate their behavior or counteract the production timing imposed by the cartel
(see Levenstein and Suslow (2006)).
8chosen by the cartel implies that all ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities. Otherwise, a
leader’s role to the cartel and a follower’s role to the fringe is assigned.
This ﬁnding casts doubt on the cartel literature’s assumption of a Stackelberg cartel for
a quantity-setting model. Intuitively, when δ is large enough, collusion with leadership
and with simultaneous play can be both sustained as a SPNE of the repeated game.
However, the size of the stable cartel is smaller when the cartel is allowed to lead because
ﬁrms inside the cartel ﬁnd it desirable to exit. In other words, it is precisely the success of
the leader cartel what may reduce the incentives to participate in it. However, when ﬁrms
simultaneously choose quantities, the incentives to free-ride from a cartel by defecting from
it are reduced since by leaving the cartel, ﬁrms risk the complete collapse of collusion.
Consequently, the cartel decides to behave as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the
fringe only when collusion is not easily sustained.
3 Concluding comments
Several economists have investigated the endogenous timing in oligopoly games (see for
instance Robson (1990), Albæk (1992) or Mailath (1993)). These papers suggested that
t h eS t a c k e l b e r gm o d e li sm o r ep l a u s i b l et h a nt h eC o u r n o tm o d e li fﬁrms can choose when
to take their actions. We addressed the question of whether the Stackelberg sequence is
also appropriate in a quantity-setting cartelistic model. To that extent, we have developed
a theoretical framework to study how in a repeated game setting, the sequence of play
b e t w e e nt h ec a r t e la n dt h ef r i n g ea ﬀects cartel stability. We show that the size of the
stable cartel crucially depends on the sequence of each ﬁrm’s choice: when the cartel
behaves as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe a stable leader cartel contains
just over half the ﬁrms in the industry. On the other hand, when all ﬁrms simultaneously
choose quantities the smallest cartel among those that are sustainable is stable. As a
consequence, we obtain that the results of an endogenous sequence of play between a
stable cartel and a fringe are mixed since a leader’s role to the cartel and a follower’s
role to the fringe should only be assigned when the discount factor is not large. Then,
9our model enables us to raise serious doubts on the cartel literature’s assumption of a
Stackelberg cartel for a quantity-setting model.
Several interesting issues have not been addressed in this paper. First of all, although
the empirical evidence provides support for the exercise of market power by cartels, the
assumption that the production timing is also imposed by the cartel could be relaxed.
Second, the concept proposed by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) for cartel stability conjectures
that the rest of the cartel will remain together and that no independent ﬁrm will react.
This assumption is relaxed in Thoron (1998) and Diamantoudi (2005) and taking into
account coalitional deviations and foresight respectively, a non-empty set of stable cartels
is obtained under certain conditions. On the other hand, in Morasch (2000) strategic
alliances are considered. They diﬀer from traditional cartels in that member ﬁrms are
aware of the fact that fringe ﬁrms react to collusion by expanding their output, and may
use the alliance contract as a strategic commitment device. He obtains that in a linear
Cournot oligopoly with at most ﬁve ﬁrms only one alliance forms whereas with more than
ﬁve ﬁrms an alliance structure with at least two alliances results. To summarize, the
framework we have worked with is, admittedly, a particular one. To analyze real-world
cartels, additional research is required and the issues mentioned above should also be
considered. We believe that those are subjects for future research.
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10Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we prove that in the one-shot game when all ﬁrms simulta-
neously choose quantities, no cartel is stable, namely Πc(N,K) < Πf(N,K − 1).I tc a n






Then, internal stability holds if Πc(N,K)−Πf(N,K−1) = 1
K(N−K+2)2 − 1
(N−K+3)2 ≥ 0






K +K] but this
cannot hold when K ≤ N. Therefore, ﬁrms have always incentives to leave the cartel in
the one-shot game. We denote by δ
C
K the critical level of the discount factor above which






T h e n ,i ti sa l s oe a s yt oc h e c kt h a tδ
C
K ≤ 1 is only true when K ≥ 3




Note that this condition is exactly the same in Salant et al. (1983) which says that the
minimum proﬁtable agreement under Cournot oligopoly involves at least 80 percent of











2 + N − 1
2
√
5+4 N. Thus, δ
C
K is strictly decreasing in K when δ
C
K ∈ (0,1).T h e n ,
if δK ≤ δ<δ K−1 only a cartel of K or more ﬁrms can be sustained as a SPNE of the
repeated game (that is, the cutoﬀ of the discount factor decreases with the size of the
cartel) and can thus be stable since with less than K ﬁrms, by joining the cartel ﬁrms
would obtain the Cournot proﬁts and condition (4) would not be satisﬁed. On the other
hand, the cartel containing more than K ﬁrms is not stable either because smaller cartels
are sustainable and we have just shown that Πc(N,K) − Πf(N,K − 1) < 0 (namely,
when cartels can be enforced like in the one shot game, and in this case this is true for the
smaller cartel that can be sustained, ﬁrms have an incentive to leave the cartel). Therefore,
when K ≥ 3
2 + N − 1
2
√
5+4 N (namely, δK ∈ (0,1))i fδ ≥ δK it is immediate to verify




0(N,K − 1) = 1
1−δΠ(N)
(remember that obviously, Πc(N,K) > Π(N) ∀K ≥ 2). On the other hand, it can be
veriﬁed that external stability is satisﬁe di nt h eo n e - s h o tg a m e( Πf(N,K) ≥ Πc(N,K+1))
11if 1
(2+N−K)2 − 1
(1+K)(1+N−K)2 ≥ 0 w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u ei fK ≤ N. Then, condition (5) is





0(N,K +1 )= 1
1−δΠc(N,K +1 ) . In other words, in the latter case the cartel of K +1
ﬁrms is sustainable and regarding the external stability, the analysis of the one-shot game
applies and cartels are also stable in the repeated game.
Proof of Proposition 2. We proceed like in the proof of Proposition 1 and we ﬁrst





4b(N−K+1)2. It can be easily veriﬁed that
internal and external stability become
(2K2+(2+N)2−K(5+3N))
K(1+N−K)(2−K+N)2 ≥ 0 and
(1+K(2K−1)+N(N−3K+1))
(1+K)(K−N)(1−K+N)2 ≥ 0 respectively. If N<4
external stability is never met unless K = N. In this case, internal stability holds if




(N − 2)N − 7+5
4 and external
stability holds if K>1
4(1 + 3N −
p









(N − 2)N − 7) = 1, stable cartel exists only when
both conditions hold and this is true for K ∈ [f(N),f(N)+1]where f(N) ≡ 1
4(1+3N −
p
(N − 2)N − 7). Note that this parallels the results in Shaﬀer (1995) (Proposition 4,
page 746).
Regarding the repeated game, we denote by δ
S
K the critical level of the discount factor









K is calculated assuming that if a cartel ﬁrm deviates fringe ﬁrms optimally
respond to the deviation. It is easy to check that δ
S
K ∈ (0,1) and δ
S
K strictly increasing
with K are true iﬀ K ≥ N+1
2 . Also, one can check that f(N) > N+1
2 . Then, we can apply
exactly the same argument of the proof of Proposition 1 for the case where N ≥ 4:W h e n
ac a r t e lo fs i z eK>f (N)+1is sustainable, only a cartel of K or less ﬁrms can also be
sustained as a SPNE of the repeated game. However, as we showed above, in this case
ﬁrms have an incentive to leave the cartel since a smaller cartel can be sustained and thus






121).I n w o r d s , i f a ﬁrm leaves the cartel, collusion can still be sustained and therefore,
the cartel is not stable. On the other hand, when the a cartel of size K<f (N) can be
sustained, only a cartel of K or less ﬁrms can be sustained as a SPNE of the repeated
game (recall that the case where K<N+1
2 is ruled out since δ
S
K / ∈ (0,1)). However, as we





0(N,K +1 )= 1
1−δΠc(N,K +1 ) . Therefore,
when the cartel is sustainable (namely, δ ≥ δK) for all K>f (N)+1internal stability
does not hold and when K<f (N) external stability does not hold either. Thus, iﬀ when
K ∈ [f(N),f(N)+1 ]and the cartel is sustainable, it can also be stable. Note also that
if the cartel is not sustainable, (for instance δ = δK −  <δ K) internal stability does




0(N,K − 1) = 1
1−δΠf(N,K − 1).F i n a l l y ,w h e n
N<4 (in our model, since we assume N>2,t h i sc a s ei so n l yN =3 )i ti si m m e d i a t e
to see that if K<N , the cartel cannot be stable for any δ since the external stability
condition mentioned above does not hold: 1
(−4+K)2 + 1
K(K−2)−3 < 0 if K =2 . When






1−δΠf(N,K−1) and as we showed above,
in this case the cartel is stable in the one-shot game and consequently also in the repeated
game.
Proof of Corollary 1. The result is directly implied by the proof of Propositions 1
and 2 since 3




4(1 + 3N −
p
(N − 2)N − 7):w h e n K ≥
3





K is strictly decreasing in K and smaller than 1, thus there exists
¯ δ ∈ (0,1) ≥ δ ¯ K such that when δ ≥ ¯ δ, ¯ K>f (N)+1 is the stable cartel under simultaneous
play.
Proof of Proposition 3. We denote by Πc
c(N,K) the proﬁt function of a cartel ﬁrm
when cartel and fringe ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities. Equivalently, let Πc
s(N,K)







4bK(N−K+1)2.W ea s s u m et h a ta tt =0 ,
ﬁrms foresee and are perfectly informed about which is going to be the size of the stable
cartel for any δ with leadership and with simultaneous play. We assume that the number of







∂K are positive and thus, both are monotonous increasing
functions of K. On the other hand, the following is true: Πc
s(N, 3






2 + N − 1
2
√
5+4 N) and Πc
s(N, 3
2 + N − 1
2
√
5+4 N) < Πc
c(N,N). Therefore, there
exists ˜ K ∈ (3
2 + N − 1
2
√
5+4 N,N] such that Πc
s(N, 3





Since ∀K ≥ 3










also ˜ δ ≡ δ ˜ K < 1 such that when δ ≥ ˜ δ, the size of the stable cartel under simultaneous
play is K ≥ ˜ K whereas under cartel leadership is ˆ K ∈ [f(N),f(N)+1]< ˜ K. Thus, when
δ ≥ ˜ δ cartel ﬁrms would prefer the simultaneous play and would not behave a Stackelberg
leader since Πc
s(N, ˆ K) < Πc
c(N,K), that is, cartel ﬁrms would obtain higher proﬁts in the
stable cartel under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership. The reverse is true
when δ<˜ δ.
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